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<title><![CDATA[Comentarios al libro: CIA WIZARDS OF LANGLEY: OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE (OSI) HISTORY AND AMAZING COLD WAR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS - ATOMIC, CHEMICAL, BIO WEAPONS, ... ICBM, ROCKETS, SATELLITES (ENGLISH EDITION)]]></title>
<link><![CDATA[https://www.biblioeteca.com/biblioeteca.web/titulo/cia-wizards-of-langley%3A-office-of-scientific-intelligence-%28osi%29-history-and-amazing-cold-war-soviet-intelligence-products---atomic%2C-chemical%2C-bio-weapons%2C-...-icbm%2C-rockets%2C-satellites-%28english-edition%29]]></link>
<description><![CDATA[This is a print replica reproduction of nearly 60 declassified CIA documents (over 1800 pages) with fascinating details about the intelligence assessment of Soviet space, missile, and weapons technologies during the Cold War. This overview and collection of documents and other material related to the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) offer a glimpse of CIA's overall contribution to the analysis of Soviet capabilities in science and technology during the Cold War. It highlights some key events and selected activities that contribute to our understanding of the unique role OSI played in the Agency's history. With the emergence of the cold war, CIA formed OSI in January 1949. OSI's revolutionary projects, such as the design and operation of national overhead systems, were vital to the nation's success.<br /><br />The complexity of the technical structure of the Soviet nuclear weapons development program and the many distinctive observables associated with it provided a classic technical intelligence challenge to US analysts. In particular, the Soviet program demanded technical data that could be obtained only by new collection techniques. By the 1950s, it was clear that the USSR possessed both nuclear weapons and the means of long-range delivery. But key questions remained for US policymakers. How far advanced and how effective were these capabilities? Could they be used against the continental United States as well as its allies? The answers to these questions were fundamental to US strategic deterrence. Technical intelligence was the primary tool US officials used to address these questions. Because the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China were “denied areas,” they posed difficult challenges to traditional forms of human and military reconnaissance collection. These countries were highly efficient police states that severely restricted internal movement and contacts with foreigners; they also had effective, modern air defenses. This meant traditional means of espionage and reconnaissance were limited in providing the needed information, much less access, by the West to Soviet Bloc weapons designers and remote test sites.<br /><br />Some of the contents include:<br /><br />Aging Communist Leaders * Interview with Former DDS&T Albert Wheelon * Truth Shall Keep You Free: Recollections by the First Deputy Director for Science and Technology * Problem of Scientific and Technical Intelligence * Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles * Case Of The SS-6 * General Order Number 13 * Identifying The Future Threat * Intelligence Implications Of Disease * CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION IN MAJOR SCIENTIFIC FIELDS - 1957-67 * MILITARY MEDICAL INSTALLATION IN GERMANY * THE SOVIET SPACE RESEARCH PROGRAM MONOGRAPH * SPACE VEHICLES * PROPULSION SYSTEMS * GUIDANCE AND CONTROL * SPACE MEDICINE * SPACE BIOLOGY AND ASTROBIOLOGY * ASTRONOMICAL ASPECTS * The Problem of Scientific and Technical Intelligence * SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS * NIE 11-3-65: Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses * SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM TO MID-1957 * GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US * GUIDED MISSILE FIELD * SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK / Strategic Attack * EMPLOYMENT OF BW AND CW IN THE EVENT OF ATTACKS UPON THE US * Accuracy Of National Intelligence Estimates * Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series: OSI 1949-68  * OSI Survey Report * Policing a Nuclear Test Ban * Possible Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation * SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: ORIGINS OF A DIRECTORATE * Scientific And Technical Intelligence Analysis * Soviet ICBM Program * Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses * Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960-1975 * Case For A Holistic Intelligence * Enigma Of Soviet BW * French Nuclear Weapons * SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE * BIOASTRONAUTICS RESEARCH PROGRAM * The YO-YO Story: An Electronics Analysis * Winnowing Wheat From Chaff]]></description>
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